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THE OFFER OF AN ACT FOR A PROMISE
The term "unilateral contract" is frequently used in an undesirable
sense to mean that there is no contract at all, either because there has
been no acceptance of the offer or because there is no consideration
for the promise to be enforced.' It should be used only where the
agreement of the two parties has created a single duty and not mutual
duties, with a single correlative right in the opposite party and not
mutual rights. The term has been subjected to some criticism, 2 a
criticism that is mainly due to a failure to distinguish between physical
facts, and the jural relations of persons caused by such facts. There
cannot be "unilateral twins" sagely remarks Mr. Ewart, not observ-
'Morrow v. Southern Ex. Co. (1897) ioI Ga. 81o, 28 S. E. 998; Ziehm v.
Frank Steil B. Co. (917) 131 Md. 582, 102 AtI. o5; Meade v. Poppenberg
(915) 167 App. Div. 411, 153 N. Y. Supp. 182. See Corbin, 'Offer and Accept-
ance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
173; I Williston, Contracts (i92o) sec. 13.
'See the review of Anson on Contract (Am. ed. by Corbin, i919) in 33
HARV. L. REv. 626.
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ing that where twins exist as a fact it is quite possible for twin A
to be under a duty to twin B in the absence of any duty whatever on
the part of twin B to twin A.
The single duty existing in the case of a unilateral contract may
rest either upon the offeree or upon the offeror, the correlative right
being of course in the opposite party. In other words, the offer may
confer a power on the offeree to create, by his subsequent voluntary
act, either a duty on himself or a duty on the offeror. The latter is
far the more frequent.3
Of the former Professor Williston says :4 "Even when the offeror
in terms offers an act of his own in exchange for a promise to be made
by the offeree, the words of the offer are necessarily promissory, for
the offeror must in the nature of the case, announce that he will do
a certain act in the future, in return for a promise to be made to him.
Indeed an offer which requests from the offeree a promise vill, when
accepted, always ripen into a bilateral rather than a unilateral con-
tract, except in one narrow class of cases; namely, where the very
giving of the promise by the offeree also has the effect of completing
the act promised by the offeror. The only instance of this sort that
can be supposed arises where the offeror offers (that is, promises)
to transfer title to personal property on receiving a specified promise
from the offeree."
This language is open to objection. It is inaccurate to say that
"the offeror must, in the nature of the case, announce that he will
do a certain act in the future" ;5 for, as -the author himself says in
the next sentence, in some cases "the very giving of the promise
by the offeree also has the effect of completing the act promised by
the offeror." This makes it perfectly clear that the only act left to
be done is the act of the offeree. In such case there is in fact no
promise of any sort by the offeror, no "undertaking to do something
in the future." An offer of title to personal property in return for
a promise by the offeree is not a "promise to transfer." It creates
not a duty in the offeror but a pbwer in the offeree. The only operative
act still to take place" is an act of the offeree, the making of the
requested promise.7 After making his offer, the offeror may go
peacefully to sleep, confident that title to his chattel will pass to the
offeree upon the latter's acceptance.8
'See illustrations given in (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 173.
4 i Williston, op. cit., sec. 25.
"It is not safe to trust to the "nature of the case." This often means, as
here, that the writer has chosen his own major premise and then assumes
that it is infallibly and exclusively the true one. The assumption may here
be due to the author's having defined a contract as "a promise or set of
promises." Ibid., sec. i.
aI Williston, op. cit., sec. 24.
'See Mactier v. Frith (183o, N. Y.) 6 Wend. 1o3; Y. B. 17 Edw. 4, 2.
* It seems not improbable that the courts will in the future hold acceptance
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That the illustration in the passage quoted above is not the "only
instance of this sort" may be observed from a study of Suter v.
Farmers' Fertilizer Company (1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 304. The plain-
tiff was a broker who had negotiated with the Aetna Explosives Com-
pany on behalf of the defendant, the result of the negotiation being
that the defendant contracted with the Aetna Company to supply it
with six hundred tons of sulphuric acid per month for twelve months
at twenty-seven dollars per ton, specifically promising the Aetna
Company in that contract to pay Suter, the broker, a commission of
one per cent, "said brokerage to be paid as payments of the price
were received by the defendant." After'a few small deliveries had
been made, on which the commission was paid to the plaintiff, the
Aetna Company got into financial difficulties; it agreed with the
defendant to rescind the contract for acid and paid to the defendant
the sum of $45,000 as consideration. The court held that the defend-
ant was bound to pay the plaintiff the agreed commission on the agreed
purchase price of the entire amount of acid and not merely on the
$45,0o0 received.
In this case the defendant denied that it had ever employed the
plaintiff as broker, although there was some evidence to the contrary.
The court rightly found it unnecessary to determine this question,
for the plaintiff had in fact offered his services to the defendant,
for pay, the latter had already received the benefit of these services
in that a willing buyer was now at hand, and he now expressly
promised a third party to pay for them. The contract thus made was
unilateral, the services of the plaintiff being fully performed prior
to the making of the express promise by the defendant. No duty
ever rested on the plaintiff, but a duty to pay now rests on the defend-
ant.9 This case therefore clearly suggests the possibility -of an offer
of executed service for a return promise. A broker may without
request on the part of the principal find and bring him a willing
to be operative, even though the offeror is dead and no longer capable of acting.
See German Civil Code, sec. 153.
'It is not within the scope of this comment; but the court seems to be quite
right in holding that the defendant's agreed duty was to pay one per cent
on the full contract price, and that the express condition precedent of payment
by the Aetna Company was nullified by the fact that the defendant, by voluntary
rescission, itself prevented the fulfillment of the condition. The defendant
does not allege that the Aetna Company was insolvent. One cannot escap'e a
duty by voluntarily preventing the fulfillment of a condition .precedent to such
duty by a third party; and such prevention does not cease to be voluntary
merely because it seems that sound business policy requires it. See Camden
v. Jarrett (1907) 83 C. C. A. 492, 154 Fed. 788; Brackett v. Knowlton (1912)
io9 Me. 43, 82 Atl. 436; Loehr v. Dickson (igio) 141 Wis. 332, 124 N. W. 293;
Rumsey v. Livers (igio) 12 Md. 546, 77 Atl. 295; Weinberg v. Shulman
(913) 53 Pa. Sup. Ct. 64; Dupont Powder Co. v. Schlottman (914, C. C. A.
2d) 218 Fed. 353; Colvin v. Post Mtge. & Land Co. (1919) 225 N. Y. 51o,
122 N. E. 454.
53
YALE LAW JOURNAL
and able purchaser, informing the principal that he will expect a
commission if a sale is made. The broker's work is then all done and
he makes no promise. No doubt the principal can then make a sale to
the purchaser introduced by the broker without binding himself to
pay a commission. This is because the services have been thrust upon
him; he is privileged not to accept the offer and he is not disabled
from making a sale without accepting the offer.10 But the point is
that he has the power to accept the offer and to bind himself, this
power to be exercised by making the sale and by expressing assent
to the broker's proposal. In the case cited this is exactly what the
defendant did."'
The case is not substantially different where the broker has rendered
his service at the request of one who assumed without authority to
act as the agent of the principal, although in holding the principal
bound by his acceptance of the services the courts will now use the
language of agency; they will speak of his being bound by "ratifica-
tion." But this ratification is identical with the acceptance of an
offer; and on such ratification, the resulting contract is unilateral
exactly as above. The broker has made no promise and his services
are all done before the principal makes any promise. This may be a
case of past consideration; but if so we must make the best of it.
With respect to consideration these cases must be distinguished
from the offer of a conveyance of property in return for a promise,
referred to above. In neither case does the offeror make a promise
or offer to undertake a duty. In both cases the offeror confers a
power upon the offeree. But in the property case the exercise of the
power by the offeree,- the acceptance, will be detrimental to the offeror
and beneficial to the offeree, since it is the final operative act effecting
the conveyance of the property. This detriment and benefit are con-
temporaneous with the making 6f the offeree's promise, and so it
may be argued that the consideration is not past, even though the
acts of the offeror are all long since past. In the present case the
exercise of the power by the offeree is not detrimental to the offeror
(the promisee) or beneficial to the offeree (the promisor). By the act
of acceptance nothing is taken from the promisee or given to the
"0 Walton v. Clark (893) 54 Minn. 341, 56 N. W. 40; McVickar v. Roche
(1902) 74 App. Div. 397, 77 N. Y. Supp. 5o; Ballentine v. Mercer (19o8)
130 Mo. App. 6o5, 109 S. W. 1037.
'That the same decision might have been reached on some different ground
is obvious, but the decision should be supported as it stands. See in accord:
Edson v. Poppe (19o) 24 S. D. 466, 124 N. W. 44i; Muir v. Kane (igog)
55 Wash. 131, io4 Pac. 153; Spencer v. Potter (91) 85 Vt. i, 8o Atl. 821;
Boothe v. Fitzpatrick (1864) 36 Vt. 681; Ferguson v. Harris (1893) 39 S. C.
323, x7 S. E. 782; Anderson v. Best (1896) 176 Pa. 498, 35 Atl. I94. Contra:
Sharp v. Hoopes (i9o6) 74 N. J. L. I9i, 64 Atl. 989; Bagnole v. Madden
(9o8) 76 N. J. L. 255, 69 Atl. 967; Wulff v. Lindsay (i9o3) 8 Ariz. 168, 7i
Pac. 963. See also notes in 53 L. R. A. 373, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 526.
COMMENTS
promisor. The only new legal relations created by acceptance are a
duty in the promisor and its correlative right in the promisee. These
are in every respect beneficial to the latter. The only possible con-
sideration for the promise, therefore, is the past action of the offeror
(promisee). This action was indeed detrimental to him and beneficial
to the offeree (promisor), but it lies in the past and at the time it
occurred it created no right or duty either contractual or quasi-
contractual.
The fact that the promisee has conferred an actual financial benefit
on the promisor may well be regarded as a sufficient cause or reason
for the enforcement of the express promise. The sale itself is not
being forced upon the promisor, and the existence of the definite
financial benefit takes the case out of the limbo of mere uncertain
ethical opinion. No doubt decisions of this kind rest upon some moral
obligation theory. So do all other past consideration cases. They do
not rest upon any theory of quasi-contract, for the reason that the
express promise of the defendant is held to be a necessary operative
fact determining the amount of the recovery. The judgment is for
the amount promised, not the amount of the value received and unjustly
retained by the defendant.
12
The doctrine that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration
is supposed to have been "exploded," -but within limits it is far from
dead. The doctrine of consideration itself rests upon moral obliga-
tion in a broad sense. It rests upon the mores of society-those
approved rules, customs, and ideas that are generally believed to make
for general welfare. In individual disputes the doctrine becomes a
test of what the mores are and of the existence of social and moral
obligation. But it must always be remembered that the mores deter-
mine the doctrine and that the doctrine does not control the mores.
In no living and changing society can any legal rule or doctrine
remain unchanged. It is only by giving the doctrine of consideration
a continually new content that the doctrine itself can continue to live.
It seems clear that in this way the doctrine of consideration is
approaching the doctrine of causa in the Roman law.138 Societal con-
ditions in Roman and Continental life are not so different from those
of England, America, and the English colonies as to prevent a similar
development in law. It is the function of our courts to keep the
doctrines up to date with the mores by continual restatement and by
giving them a continually new content.1 4 This is judicial legislation,
"In Wright v. Farmer's Bank (1903) 31 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 72 S. W. io3,
the plaintiff voluntarily paid the defendant's debt, and a later promise to pay
was enforced. Here the amount is identical with the enrichment.
"8See Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 621.
"' This shows the futility of codification as an attempt at final crystallization
of the mores, though not as a means of careful and conservative legislation
to do away with some doubts and conflicts.
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and the judge legislates at his peril. Nevertheless, it is the necessity
and duty of such legislation that gives to judicial office its highest
honor; and no brave and honest judge shirks the duty or fears the
peril.
A. L. C.
THE CORPORATE ENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Two recent decisions of the British Privy Council, The Kronprinzes-
sin Cecilie (Part Cargo ex) (1919, P. C.) 119 L. T. R. 457 and The
Hamborn (i99, P. C.) ii L. T. R. 463 illustrate the vicissitudes of
the corporate entity theory in time of war. In the first case an
American corporation, The Vacuum Oil Company, shipped a cargo
of oil, f. o. b. on a German ship, to two of its subsidiary companies
organized in Germany and Austria, practically all of whose stock was
owned by the parent company in the United States. Notwithstanding
tfiis fact and an agreement by which the parent company undertook
to bear any loss by reason of the failure of the goods to reach the
subsidiary, the British prize court condemned the goods as "enemy
owned." In the second case, a Dutch vessel flying the Dutch flag had
been captured by a British cruiser on a voyage from New York to
Cuba. It appeared that the vessel was owned by a Dutch company.
The stock of this company was owned by two other Dutch companies,
A and B. The stock in company A was in turn owned partly by B
and partly by certain German companies, whose stockholders were
Germans. The stock in company B was owned by German companies
with German stockholders. The steamship was managed by two
Germans resident in Holland, but the court found that the "control"
of all the companies was exercised from Germany, and hence that
the Dutch corporation owning the vessel was really "enemy." Thus,
to achieve this result, three layers of corporate veil were stripped from
the vessel to disclose the human beings whose economic interests as
beneficial owners it was designed to reach.
In the Vacuum Oil case the real persons whose economic interests
were affected were American citizens, but the condemnation was made
in disregard of that fact because the consignee, though a subsidiary
of an American corporation, had been organized in an enemy country.'
In the Hamborn case, the vessel was owned by a neutral corporation,
but the persons whose economic interests would be affected by the
confiscation were Germans, encased in three coats of corporate forma-
tion. The conclusion would seem to follow that the prize court is
no slave to any theory, corporate or other, but will confiscate property
whenever belligerent interests seem to make it desirable and the
'On a previous occasion, the State Department had extended its protection
to the Vacuum Oil Co. of Austria against the Austrian government, because
its stockholders were principally American citizens.
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grounds of the decision can be sustained before neutrals as sufficiently
plausible. While the large discretion thus exercisable has through
many wars become in some degree hardened into rule, the dependence.
of the prize court on municipal legislation and the conceived exigencies
of the recent war, which induced wide extensions of belligerent
powers and corresponding restrictions on time-honored neutral rights,
have made more evident than ever before the necessity for a general
right of appeal from the decisions of prize courts to an international
tribunal.
2
The decisions under review suggest a possible interest in a brief
survey of the treatment by belligerents, and particularly by their
courts, of the corporate entity in time of war. For this purpose the
determination of national character is, of course, the main object in
view and its principal spheres of application involve the power to sue
or to trade with the enemy, and the liability to condemnation or
sequestration of corporate property at sea or on land.
It has often been observed that nationality and domicil, the ordinary
tests of national character in time of war, can be applied to corpora-
tions in a metaphorical sense only.3 Yet the necessity for impairing
the economic interests of the enemy have led to the establishment of
certain tests for the fatal connection between the corporation and the
enemy territory or interests. If these tests display no consistent regard
for any particular corporate theory, the explanation is to be found in
belligerent necessity or self-interest and in the absence of any special
rule of international law on the subject.
With respect to suit by "enemy" corporations in municipal courts,
no special rules have been created by municipal legislation, except
such as are contained in the Trading with the Enemy Acts, and these
at the beginning of the war made incorporation under the law of an
enemy country the test of enemy character.4 Inasmuch as this wai
consistent with the Anglo-American criterion of corporate nationality,
no difficulty was found in adhering to it, so that in the early years
of the war British corporations were permitted to sue in Biitish
courts, regardless of the domicil or the nationality of their share-
holders.5 The principle was carried to its logical conclusion in the
decision of the Court of Appeal in the Daimler case" in which five out
of six judges considered that a British company, all but one of whose
twenty-five thousand shares were held in Germany, should be permitted
to sue in a British court 'as a friendly corporation. That startling
'See (igig) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 583.
'See (I18) 27 ibid., ro8.
'This was applied in the Boer War to a Transvaal company with a majority
of British stockholders. Janson v. Driefontein Cons. Mines, Ltd. [igo2]
A. C. 484.
5 Amorduct Mfg. Co. v. Defries (i915, C. A.) 31 Times L. R. 69.
' (C. A.) [E9r5] i K. B. 833.
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result persuaded the House of Lords, on appeal, to conclude that the
company could not sue, but they escaped an open departure from their
traditional corporate entity theory by basing the decision on the dis-
covery that the secretary had no authority to bring the action. 7 Only
Lord Halsbury was willing to pierce the corporate veil and put the
case squarely on the ground that the economic interest in the corpora-
tion was almost completely German and that it could be considered like
a partnership. Lord Parker, however, not without dutiful tribute to
the prima facie friendly character of the corporation, pronounced a
dictum that such a British company will assume an "enemy" char-
acter if its agents or the persons de facto in control of its affairs are
resident in an enemy country, or wherever resident, are adhering to
the enemy, or taking instructions from or acting under the control
of enemies.8  "Control" seemed to him the primary test, rather than
the nationality of the shareholders, and it seems that he conceived
"control" to be vested in directors, rather than in their principals,
the shareholders. That test of "control" became "something of a
fetish in subsequent cases, being applied to circumstances in which
the power to communicate, essential to control, was entirely lacking.
As the war advanced in intensity and bitterness, more stringent
tests of enemy character were fixed by statute and executive regula-
tion. The case of the domestic corporation doing business in enemy
territory, which for purposes of trading was declared to be an "enemy"
by the British Trading with the Enemy Act, came up for determination
in respect to the privilege of such a corporation to sue in British
courts. In the case of such a company, principally with British share-
holders, organized to acquire plantations in a Germany colony, the
Court of Appeal held that its "enemy" character was confined to its
I (H. L.) [1916] 2 A. C. 307. Two of the eight Law Lords dissented.
8 Justice Lehmann in Fritz Schulz Jr. Co. v. Raimes (1917, N. Y. Sup. Ct.)
Ioo Misc. 697, 166 N. Y. Supp. 567, followed Lord Parker's dictum by holding-
as friendly an American ,corporatiort the majority of whose stock was held
in Germany, but three of whose four directors were resident in the United
States, so that "control" was found not vested in alien enemies. See (1918)
27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, io8. The distinction here made between director's
"control" and stockholder's "control" seems artificial, yet the conclusion
carries out the legislative intent to permit American. corporations, regardless
of their stock ownership, to do business and sue in this country. See former
Asst. Atty. Gen. Warren in Hearings before House Committee, quoted irk
(1919) ig CoL. L. REv_ 121. Story, J., in Society, etc. v. Wheeler (1814,
C. C. N. H.) 2 Gall. io5, which passed off on a question of pleading, stated that
he would determine the character of* the corporation from the character, enemy-
or friendly, of its members. In Posselt v. D'Espard (19x7; N. J. Ch.) ioo AtL
893, a German* corporation was admitted as plaintiff, but on the ground of a.
conceived amelioration of its disabilities in the Presidential proclamation. It
is well to note that Lord Parker's dictuin excepted from the operation of the
principle the question of property. The Noordam (No. 2) [1919] P. 255, 259.
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trading privileges and not to its status as a plaintiff* in court., The
American Trading with the Enemy Act, section 2, seems intentionally
to have omitted from the classification of "alien enemy" the American
corporation (not the individual) doing business in enemy territory.
Trading with the branches of such a corporation anywhere would
thus seem, but for measures of "blockade," to have been permissible.' 0
As in England, the country of incorporation furnished the prima facie
test of nationality.
In England, enemy character was by proclamation assigned also to
corporations doing business ii territory occupied by the enemy, so
that Belgian corporations had to cease all business in Belgium to avoid
the penalties of "enemy" character in England."
The extensions of the criteria of corporate enemy character noted
in the Daimler case had-been anticipated by some of the British colonial
proclamations. For example, in Australia, trading was forbidden, as
"enemy," with any company "which the Attorney-General, by notice
published in the Gazette, declares to be, in his opinion, managed or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by or under the influence of, persons
of enemy nationality, or resident or carrying on business in an enemy
country."12 When the blacklist was instituted in England, doubtless
these were but a few of the tests of British displeasure by which
corporations throughout the world incurred its penalties.
The absence, and possibly the uselessness, of any well-defined test
for determining the national character of corporate property at sea
is illustrated by the practice in the recent war. Unhampered by any
recognized rule of international law, belligerents usually applied such
a rule as would enable them to establish a plausible connection between
the property or its owners, legal or beneficial, and the enemy territory
or interests, deemed sufficient by them to justify confiscation. With
respect to vessels, the owner is deemed bound by the flag adopted,
but not so the .captor. Thus, ships seized as prize, flying the German
'In re Hilckes (C. A.) [1917] 1 K. B. 48. See also Nigel Gold Mining Co. v.
Hoode [igoi] 2 K. B. 849, a British company with British stockholders, but
doing business in the Transvaal.
" Quaere, whether this renders obsolete the decision in Juragua Iron Co. v.
United States (1908) 212 U. S. 297, 29 Sup. Ct. 385, in which, with respect to
its property in Cuba, enemy territory, a Pennsylvania corporation was held
to be an "enemy," subjecting such prolperty to belligerent use by the American
forces. For the purpose of the case, it was unnecessary to hold this an enemy
company.
' See Central Indian Mining Co. v. Sociiti Coloniale (i9'g, C. A.) 36 Times
L. R. 88, and its reference to Soci6ti d' Aljustrel v. Anglo-Belgian Agency, Ltd.
(C. A.) [1915] 2 Ch. 4o9."
" See Welsbach Light Co. v. Commonwealth (igi6, .H. C. of A.) 22 C. L. R.
268. The English Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act, 1916, laid down
somewhat similar tests for inhibiting trade with or winding up of corporations,
as did section 3 of the United States Trading withi the Enemy Act.
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flag were, of course, condemned, regardless of the fact that the stock-
holders, the beneficial owners, were citizens or neutrals.'
3 Down to
October 2o, 1915, when-the simple and practical rule of article 57 of
the Declaration of London, by which the national character of a
vessel was determined by the flag she was entitled to fly, was abrogated
by Order in Council, 14 the neutral vessel was in theory exempt from
capture. After that date, however, the neutral flag or even neutral
corporate 'ownership did not prevent scrutiny of her actual beneficial
ownership by enemy individuals.'
5 Whether legal ownership of a
neutral vessel by an enemy corporation with a majority of neutral
stockholders would have subjected the vessel to condemnation has
not been made clear.
The most interesting cases of piercing the corporate veil involved
British vessels owned by British companies, the beneficial interest
appearing to be vested in enemies. In the St. Tudno,
8 a British
company, owning a British vessel, had three British directors who
appear to have been appointed by the Hamburg-American line, the
owners of practically all the stock.- By an agreement, the British
directors seem to have undertaken to carry out orders received from
Hamburg. By the Merchant Shipping Act a British corporation
owning a British ship must have its "principal place of business" in
British dominions. Hamburg being deemed the place whence the
British directors were "controlled," the "principal place of business"
was deemed to be Hamburg, although it seemed clear that the ship
traded only in the English coasting trade and that every decision
concerning its operation was made by the British directors, who, of
course, were unable to communicate with Hamburg. The criterion
of "control" which Lord Parker's dictum had introduced was here
carried to the length of actual unreality. "Control.' of a vessel by
I The Tommi and The Rothersand (1914) I Br. & Col. P. C. 16. See also
the "Manchuria," No. r (9o5, Japan) 2 Russ. and Jap. P. C. 52, flying the
Russian flag, and owned by Russian corporation with a majority of its stock-
holders neutrals. There was a trifling exception to this rule, in the first
months of the war, in the case of The Leda, owned by a German subsidiary of
the Standard Oil Co. 9nd flying ihe German flag; she was restored on certain
conditions because of the beneficial ownership of stock by American citizens.
On the same ground, German tankers owned by the same company in foreign
non-German ports were by Allied consent placed under the American flag.
New York Times, Apr. ii, 192o.
"'Even before that, however, the Privy Council had, in The Proton (P. C.)
[igi8] A. C. 578, disregarded the rule of art. 57 adopted by British Order- in
Council, on the ground that the Greek flag which the vessel was entitled to
fly concealed a German ownership. See (1gi8)
. 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 585.
It does not appear that the United States has departed from the rule of art.
57. See Naval Instructions Governing Maritime Warfare of June 30, 1917.
" The Hamborn [19i8] P. ig and on appeal to Privy Council (1919) 121
L. T. R. 463.
8 (igi6) 2 Br. and Col. P. C. 272.
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an enemy, as in the carrying of despatches or belligerent service is
an independent ground of condemnation, and seems to have become
confused with the "control," in the sense of majority stock owner-
ship, of a corporation. The establishment of such beneficial ownership
in Germans would have been a sufficient and clear ground of con-
demnation in the St. Tudno case. In the principal case, The Hamborn,
"conduct" derived from "control" was deemed the test of noxious-
ness, yet there was no evidence of conduct at all, but only of German
ownership of stock. Here again, dynamic control inspiring conduct
was confused with static control in the form of majority stock owner-
ship. The PolzeathW was a case somewhat similar to the St. Tudno,
except that Germans in Germany owned only nine hundred and one
out of sixteen hundred and ten shares, and, as said by Swinfen
Eady, J., "in that way hold the control of the company." Two
directors were in Germany and two in England, but the Chairman,
"the life and driving force of the company" and owner of the
majority of the stock, was in Hamburg. On proceedings for the
forfeiture of the ship on the ground that the company had its "prin-
cipal place of business" outside the Dominions in violation of the
Merchant Shipping Act, the decree was made, inasmuch as the "center
from which instructions are given" and "control is exercised," namely,
Hamburg, was the "principal place of business."
With respect to goods at sea, rules sui generis have been developed,
both with respect to individual and corporate property. If the cor-
poration is organized in enemy territory, its goods everywhere, if not
on neutral vessels, are subject to confiscation, and no attempt is made
by prize courts to determine the nationality of the stockholders."
Goods connected with a branch in enemy territory of a neutral cor-
poration or firm are confiscable, if not on neutral vessels, but do
not infect other goods of the corporation. In the early part of the
war, Sir Samuel. Evans released goods consigned to a British com-
pany, whose directors and shareholders were. all Germans. 20 He
decided to follow the decision-of the Court of Appeal in the Daimler
case, which considered itself bound by the nationality, as determined
by the place of incorporation, of the corporate entity. Doubtless his
decision would have been quite different had the case arisen the fol-
lowing year. In the Derfflinger, No. 4,21 the property of a Japanese
"7 (C. A.) [1916] P. 241.
The Roumanian (914) I Br. & Col. P. C. 75, oil consigned to a German
company, a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Co., an American corporation. See
also the principal case Kronprinzessin Cecilie (igig, P. C.) iig L. T. R. 457.
So, goods on a British ship consigned to a Biitish branch of an Austrian
company were condemned. The Achilles [igig] P. 34o.
" The Lutzow (No. 4) (i916) 2 Br. & Col. P. C. x 2. The Mukden (i9o5,
Japan) 2 Russ. and Jap. P. C. x2.
" The Poona (x9g5) i Br. & Col. P. C. 275.
21 (x96) 2 Br. & Col. P. C. io2.
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limited partnership consisting of six Germans, though a corporate
entity in Japan, was divided, the share of the partners resident in
Germany being condemned and the balance released. This is merely
an application of the rule with respect to ordinary partnerships owning
a house of trade in non-enemy territory.22 It would be highly desirable
if some uniform test of the national character of corporations in time
of war could be arrived at by international agreement.
The necessity of reaching the economic interest of enemies, to
prevent hostile use thereof, induced the various belligerents in the
late war readily to disregard the corporate entity of domestic cor-
porations by sequestrating or selling the stock owned by alien enemies
in such corporations. When the enemy interest was preponderant,
their liquidation or winding up was provided for. These provisions
indicate clearly that the ownership of shares of stock was deemed an
aliquot ownership of the corporation and its assets, such beneficial
ownership constituting the test of enemy interest. So our State
Department has usually not hesitated to interpose in behalf of Ameri-
can stockholders owning a substantial interest in a foreign corpora-
tion sustaining injury from a foreign government. For that reason,
it will be interesting to observe whether the property in Germany to
be turned over to the Allies by the Treaty of Peace, when owned by
German corporations whose stock is principally owned by American
citizens, will actually be taken as proposed. Not only would this dis-
regard the "legal or equitable interests" of allied citizens in such
property, which the Peace Treaty was designed to safeguard, but it
would in effect bring about the curious result of despoiling the citizens
of one Ally for the benefit of another, the value of the property thus
takeh being credited, on reparation account, to Germany, which has
no interest in it. An equally interesting problem is raised by the case
of the Austrian ships owned by corporations registered in Trieste
and Fiume, the stockholders having also now become nationals of Italy
or Jugoslavia, as the case may be. The economic interest impaired "by
the transfer of such ships to the Reparation Commission would clearly
be Italian or Jugoslav, and not Austrian.
E. M. B.
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OF JAPAN
De Becker's International Private Law of Japan, published in i9i9,
makes available in our own tongue the legislation of this remarkable
people with respect to the conflict of laws-a subject which is gaining
every year more importance from the standpoint of international trade.
As the Japanese law of Juie 15, 1898 (H6rei) constitutes the most
complete legislative expression of the rules of the conflict of laws
' The Clan Grant (915) i Br. & Col. P. C. 272.
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enacted in any of the leading countries of the world in recent times,
a statement of its principal provisions may be of interest.'
Renvoi. "Renvoi" is adopted with respect to the rules governing
(i) capacity, (2) marriage and divorce, (3) the relationship between
parent and child, (4) guardianship and curatorship, (5) succession
and wills, provided that the foreign law would apply Japanese law.2
Capacity. Following the trend of continental law the principle of
nationality is adopted as the rule governing private capacity.8 When
a party to a juristic act in Japan is a person of full capacity according
to Japanese law the act is valid, although he is not a person of full
capacity according to the law of his nationality.4 This qualification
does not apply, however, with respect to acts falling within the family
law or the law of succession, nor with respect to those affecting foreign
immovables.5 Whether the law of the situs or the national law of
the owner determines his capacity to convey or mortgage immovable
property does not clearly appear.6 If a party is in possession of two
or more nationalities the law of his nationality is that of the country
whose nationality he last acquired; but in case one of the plural
nationalities is that of Japan, Japanese law governs.7
Formalities. The form of a juristic act is determined by the law
governing the effect of such act. The transaction is also valid if it
conforms to the law of the place of the act, except -in the case of
juristic acts by which real rights or other rights which are regis-
trable are created or disposed of, the latter being governed by the law
of the situs.8 The continental maxim, locus regit actum, is thus adopted
in a permissive sense with the, qualification indicated. The form in
which it is expressed follows Article ii of the Introductory Act of the
German Civil Code.
Property. The law of the situs governs real rights relating to
movables and immovables,9 also the formalities with which a con-
veyance or mortgage of immovable property must be executed.1 0
Concerning capacity to convey or to mortgage immovable property,
see supra.
Contracts. The intention of the parties is the governing principle.
If the intention of the parties is uncertain the law of the place where
the contract was made controls.1" Where the contract is made by
'The provisions may be found also in a French translation in 28 Clunet,
Journal de droit international privi, 639-643.
'Art. 29 of the Law Concerning the Application of Laws in General (H6rei);
De Becker, op. cit., 74.
'Art. 3, par. I.
'Art. 3, par. 2; De Becker, op. cit., 12o. The Japanese law follows in this
regard Art. 7, par. 3, of the Introductory Act of the German Civil Code.
'Art. 3, par. 3. "See De Becker, op. cit., 76.
" Art. 27, par. f. ' Art. 8.
'Art. io. "Art. 8, par. 2.
2 Art. 7.
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correspondence it is the law of the place from which the offer was
sent. If the recipient of the offer was ignorant at the time of his
acceptance of the place from which the offer was sent, the place of
the offeror's domicil is regarded as the place of the contract.
12 The
discharge of contracts is controlled by the law governing their forma-
tion and effect. The mode of performance is subject to the law of
the place of performance; for example, the method and formality of
payment."2
Statute of Limitations. The statute of limitations is regarded as
relating to the substance and is controlled by the law governing the
obligation itself, but on grounds of policy no action can be brought
if it is barred by the statute of limitations of 
the forum.'14
Assignment of Contracts. Whether a contract or any other obliga-
tion is assignable is determined by the substantive law applicable to
the obligation. The assignment itself and its effect is determined
by the intention of the parties, and if the intention of the parties is
uncertain by the law of the place of the act.'" With respect to third
parties the effect of the assignment is determined by the law of the
debtor's domicil.' 8
Quasi-Contracts. The law of the place where the facts forming the
cause of such obligation occurred governs.'
7
Torts. The law of the place where the tort was committed controls,
but the obligation is valid only in so far as such act is unlawful
under Japanese law, and the damages involved can only be claimed
within the limits and by the methods recognized by Japanese law.'
8
Marriage. The conditions of the formation of a marriage are deter-
mined in respect to each party by the law of his or her country.'
9 As
regards formalities the law of the place of celebration appears to con-
trol absolutely. 20  Japanese subjects may contract a marriage abroad
in the form prescribed by Japanese law.
2 '
Effect of Marriage. The national law of the husband controls the
effect of marriage upon the status of husband and wife.
22  With
respect to contracts executed -in Japan the wife will be regarded as
a person of full capacity if she has such capacity 
under Japanese law.
23
Whenever a foreigner marries a Japanese woman who is the head of
a house and enters her house, or is adopted by a Japanese and married
to one of the latter's daughters, he becomes Japanese and is thus
subject to Japanese law.
2 4
=2 Art. 9, par. 2. "De Becker, op. cit., io6.
" Ibid., io9. "Art. 7.
" Art. 1o. "Art. II.
1 Art. ii; De Becker, op. cit., io5-io6.
"Art. 13, par. I.
Art. 13, par. .i; De Becker, op. cit., 117.
* Art. 23; Japanese Civil Code, art. 777.
Art. 14, par. i. ' De Becker, op. Cit., 120.
"Art. 14, par. 2; De Becker, op. cit., 121.
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Marriage contracts are governed by the law of the husband's
nationality at the time of the celebration of the marriage. If the
parties subsequently acquire the Japanese nationality or remove their
domicil to Japan the agreement, in order to be binding upon third
parties, must be registered within one year if it differs from the
Japanese legal system.25 If no marriage contract is made the rights
of the parties are determined by the law of the husband's home country
at the time of the marriage. A change of domicil or of nationality has
no effect upon their rights.
28
Divorce. Japanese courts have jurisdiction to grant a divorce to
foreigners who are domiciled in or residents of Japan.2 7 A divorce
will be granted only for a ground which is recognized as such under
the law of the home country of the husband at the time the act
occurred, and under Japanese law.
2 8
Parent and Child. The conditions for the legitimation of an ille-
gitimate child are governed, with respect to the father or mother,
by the law of the state to which such father or mother belongs at the
time of such legitimation, and with respect to the child by the law of
the state to which the child belongs at that time. The effects of the
legitimation are determined by the national law of the father or
mother.29 The conditions of adoption are governed in respect to each
party by the law of his or her home country.2 0 The effect of adoption
is determined by the law of the home country of the adoptive parent.31
The parental power is determined by the law of the home country of
the father, or, if he is dead, by that of the mother, within the limits
recognized by the law of the place where it is to be exercised 2 The
rights of the parent with respect to the property of the child, whether
movable or immovable, are governed by the law of the father's
nationality or, if he is dead, by that of the mother.33
Support. The duty to furnish support is controlled by the law of
the home country of the party from whom it is demanded.3 '
Guardianship and Curatorship. An alien domiciled or resident in
Japan may be placed under guardianship or curatorship if there is a
sufficient ground according to the law of his home country and there
is no person to exercise the function of a guardian under the law of
his home country. When the guardian is appointed by a Japanese
court the legal relations involved in the guardianship are governed by
Japanese law; if appointed by a foreign court, they are determined
by the law of the home country of the ward.
3 5
'Art. 15. " De Becker, Op. cit., 123-124.
Art. 1, Law Concerning the Procedure in Actions Relating to Personal
Status. De Becker, op. cit., 124.
' Art. ii. 2'Art. i8, par. 2.
"Art. ig, first part. "Art. i9, second part.
'Art. 20; De Becker, op. cit., 135. 'Art. 20.
" Art. 2z. '"Arts. 23, 24.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Succession. Intestate succession to movables and immovables is
governed by the national law of the decedent.386 The material condi-
tions and effect of a will, whether it relates to movable or immovable
property, are determined by the law of the home country of the testator
at the time of the execution of the will.37  A change of nationality
produces no effect. A will is sufficient in formal respects regardless
of the character of the property, if it satisfies the law of the home
country of the testator at the time of the execution of the will or the
law of the place of execution.8 A will may be revoked according to
the law of the home country of the testator at the time of revoking,
or according to the law of the place of the act.3 9
The foregoing summary shows that the Japanese legislator has
accepted the continental rules of the conflict of laws. Only in one
instance can there be seen any approach to the English system, namely,
in the rule governing torts. One or two points deserve special atten-
tion. Contrary to the prevailing view on the subject it accepts the
renvoi in the limited form suggested by the German Civil Code. With
respect to the question of nationality it has decided a point which has
troubled the continental writers a good deal. 40 What is the law of a
party's nationality for the purpose of the conflict of laws when he
is claimed as a subject by two or more foreign governments? The
Japanese law adopts the rule that it is the law of the country whose
nationality was last acquired. As regards contracts by correspondence
it is interesting to note that the Japanese law accepts the law of the
place from which the offer was sent, except that the law of the domicil
of the offeror is substituted if the recipient of the offer was ignorant
of the place from which the offer was sent.
E. G. L.
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF WHOLESOMENESS AGAIN
Charged waters replace strong waters, and with the change come
perils little thought of. A recent case1 lists "articles inherently
dangerous": poisQns, dynamite, gunpowder, torpedoes-and soft drink
bottles! One who manufactures such articles, says the court, is liable
in tort to third parties whom their explosion injures, unless he can
prove that he has exercised reasonable care with reference to the article
manufactured. Such treatment of the pop-bottle as of itself a danger-
"Art.. 25. 'Art. 26.
"Art. 26, Dar.i. 'Art. 26, par. 2.
' See. (1920) 2o COL. L. REV. 250-252.
'Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co. (192o, C. C. A. 2d) 261 Fed. 878, (1920)
29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 568. In this comment the attempt is to analyze, not
to state the law in full, nor to give full citations. For more complete and
detailed statement of the positive law see (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io68,
(1919-20) 5 IOWA L. BULL. 6, 86, and the other comments collected in note 16.
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ous instrument has been by no means universal,2 but there is consider-
able authority in its favor, particularly among the very recent cases 3
There is some difference of opinion on whether knowledge by the
manufacturer that his bottles explode is a condition to imposing the
strict duty upon him;' and there is a difference as to what facts suffice
to establish prima fade breach of that duty in the individual case.5
But there seems to be unanimity among American plaintiffs in laying
their case in tort. Our English brethren have found a simpler method
of recovery-perhaps under pressure of necessity, since they do not
recognize the liability in tort.6 In Geddling v. Marsh (1920, K. B.)
36 Times L. R. 337, recovery was allowed a vendee under the Sale of
Goods Act, 1893, sec. 14 (I)-our Sales Act, sec. 15 (I)--on an
implied warranty. To be sure, the bottles had not been sold with the
mineral waters, but hired against a deposit, as is usual here as well.
But the court held the bottles to be goods "supplied under a contract
of sale"; hence, since they were known to be for the particular pur-
pose of containing the drinks, and since the buyer relied on the seller
in regard to them, there was an implied warranty of their fitness for
that purpose. The decision seems a fair interpretation of the statute;
it makes negligence immaterial, thus going beyond even the res ipsa
loquitur rule; it will hoist dealer as well as manufacturer on his own
gas-charged petard.
Implied warranty of this kind is a growing thing. It has currently
been thought to confer rights on vendees only. Indeed there was a
long-persistent tendency to look upon rights even in tort for injury
suffered from defective goods as founded on a "legal duty incident
to" the contract, although not contained in its terms, and so to limit
such rights to persons "privy" to the contract-whether sale or
'Glaser v. Seitz (i9o, Sup. Ct.) 71 N. Y. Supp. 942, 35 Misc. 34I; O'Neill
v. James (19o4) I38 Mich. 567, iOi N. W. 828, 68 L. R. A. 342; Stone v.
Van Noy R. R. News Co. (1913) 153 Ky. 24o, 154 S. W. 1092.
' W~eiser v. Holzman (1903) 33 Wash. 87, 73 Pac. 797; Grant v. Chero-Cola
Bottling Co. (1918) 176 N. C. 256, 97 S. E. 27, considerably extending Cashwell
v. Fayetteville Pepsi-Cola Bottling Works (1917) I74"N. C. 324, 93 S. E. 901;
cf. Colyar v. Little Rock Bottling Works (1914) 114 Ark. 140, 169 S. W. 8io;
cf. Payne v. Rome Coca Cola Bottling Co. (r912) io Ga. App. 763, 73 S. E. 3O87.
" Such knowledge necessary: Colyar v. Little Rock Bottling Works, supra;
Stone Xi. Van Noy R. R. News Co., supra. Contra, Payne v. Rome Coca Cola
Bottling Co., supra; Weiser v. Holzman, supra; cf. Grant v. Chero-Cola Bottling
Co., supra.
Applying res ipsa loquitur from the mere fact of the one explosion: Payne
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,. supra. Denying res ipsa loquitur: Glaser v. Seitz,
supra; O'Neill v. James, supra; Cashwell v. Fayetteville Bottling Co., supra.
Allowing evidence of other explosions to go to jury: Dail v. Taylor (igog) 151
N. C. 284, 66 S. E. 135, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 949; Colyar v. Little Rock Bottling
Works, supra.
'Earl v. Lubbock (C. A.) [19o5] i K. B. 253; Bates v. Batey [1913] 3
K. B. 351.
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bailment or whatnot.' It was a great advance to free the tort duty
of the maker from such an arbitrary delimitation of the persons pro-
tected by it. It might be an advance equally great to cease attempts
to mark off classes of ordinary articles, dangerous articles, and foods
and drugs, with specifications of the degree of care required of a
maker in each class, and to lay down a single controlling principle:
that any maker of any article is under a duty to any legitimate user,
in making the article and putting it into commerce, to use care com-
mensurate to the nature of the article; or, still more sweepingly, that
any person putting an article in the way of being used by another, is
under a duty to use the care proper in view of what he ought to know
of the nature and use of the article.'
But is it an equal advance to extend indefinitely the class of persons
protected by an "implied warranty"? One comes on dicta that such a
"warranty" may give full rights to a person for whose benefit it was
intended, though he be not the buyer.9 And in Davis v. Van Camp
Packing Co. (192o, Iowa) 176 N. W. 382, where the son of the pur-
chaser from the retailer who bought from the wholesaler who bought
from the manufacturer, was suing the last on an implied warranty of
wholesomeness of a can of beans, it was held error not to let the case
go to the jury on that question. "The question as to privity is not
controlling."10 It was also held, and wisely so, that the possibility of
recovery on such a warranty did not exclude the possibility of an
alternate recovery for negligence; and that the plaintiff might join
counts drawn on the two theories. 1
' See 29 Cyc. 478; and see Dail v. Taylor, supra, doubted in Cashwell v.
Fayetteville etc. Works, supra, and repudiated in Grant v. Chero-Cola Bottling
Co., supra.
' Here, as elsewhere where matters relating to torts are touched on, the writer
is indebted to the suggestions and criticism of Professor Edward S. Thurston.
See also Chapin, Torts (1917) 517; and see the language of Brett, M. R. in
Heaven v. Pender (1883) II Q. B. D. 503. "Whenever one person is by cir-
cumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of
ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances
he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of another, a duty
arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger."
'See e. g. O'Neill v. Janes, supra; (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1071, note
15; cf. Lewis v. Terry (1896) III Calif. 39, 43 Pac. 398; Tomlinson v. Armour
& Co. (19o8, Ct. Err.) 75 N. J. L. 748, 7o AtI. 314, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 923.
10 See in accord Catani v. Swift & Co. (1915) 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931.
"t That the two theories can coexist is so obvious as to need no further argu-
ment. (Yg18) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io68, 1073. And the modern decisions
are taking this view. See the admirable set of Massachusetts decisions: Ward
v. Great Atlantic etc. Co., Ash z. Childs Dining Hall Co., Friend v. Same (igi8)
231 Mass. 9o, 86, 65, 12o N. E.' 225, 396, 407; Walters v. United Grocery Co.
(1918, Utah) 172 Pac. 473; Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co. (1gi6) V7I
N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958; see Tavani v. Swift & Co. (1918) 262 Pa. 184, 1o5 Atl.
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There is much work still to be done before it will become clear
what is truly meant by "implied warranty" in such a case. Roughly,
it may be suggested that it is an insurer's duty on the warrantor to
make good damage-measured either as if in contract or as if in
tort-caused to the warrantee by non-conformance of the goods with
the warranty; that it arises normally in conjunction with a sale;
and that it arises, theoretically, out of a tacit representation by seller
to buyer, on which the buyer reasonably relies.12 But "tacit" repre-
sentations need interpretation. Is the representation one of good
faith merely, or of diligence, or of the objective existence of a quality?
Is it: "this article is, flatly, thus"; or "it is thus, as far as my due
care could make it"; or merely "it is thus, so lar as I know"? Under
our law, where the warranty exists at all, the strong tendency is to
measure it as a flat representation of the existence of the quality
concerned. There is a further tendency to standardize both the
representation and the reliance on it: "Where a dealer sells food for
immediate consumption, there is always an implied warranty of
55; and see the dissent in Drury v. Armour & Co. (1919, Ark.) 216 S. W. 40.
Nor is there sound reason why counts on the two theories should not be joined,
even in jurisdictions which will not allow joining counts in tort and contract.
Current conceptions notwithstanding, warranty is quite as much tort as contract,
especially implied warranty. Unlike assumpsit, warranty actions have never
been freed from the marks of their origin in tort. It is not only that the damage
recoverable is normally measured as in tort. The duty involved, as is sought
to be shown in the text, is closely related to the tort duty to use care; and
where the rule of the Davis case is applied, the duty is as "general" as in tort.
And finally, suit in tort still lies in some jurisdictions on the warranty. See
Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co. (i9o8) 194 Mass. 27I, 84 N. E. 481, 15 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 884, 126 Am. St. Rep. 436; cf. Hobart v. Young (i8gi) 63 Vt. 363, 21
Atl. 612. The waste of time, money and energy where a plaintiff is forced to
select a single theory appear in the cases generally. See e. g. Ash v. Childs
Dining Hall Co., supra.
I' It is not intended here to deal in any way with those so-called implied
warranties which are merely interpretations of the words of the contractors,
as when "Manilla hemp" is held to mean "merchantable Manilla hemp." Such
a "warranty"-like any term of any executory contract-raises the question
primarily of the measure of a promise or a condition of future happenings;
the question concerning it comes up most often in comparing the promise or
condition with the alleged fulfillment of it. But an "implied warranty" proper
raises the question of the measure of the representation of existing fact, and is
related more closely to estoppel than to contract. One can clearly distinguish
two types of such warranty by "tacit representation." In the one (as in
warranty of title by the ordinary seller, or of authority by an agent assuming
to act as such) the representation is so clearly expressed in fact that reasonable
men could hardly differ as to its existence. The seller merely expresses himself
by acts instead of words: In the other class, that under discussion in this
comment, the representation is, if existent at all, at least ambiguous. Men
might differ as to its scope. The duties it imposes when it is uniformly assumed
to exist and a uniform scope is given it are therefore quite as likely to be
non-consensual as consensual. Professor Costigan's remarks in (I9O7) 20
HAxv. L. REV. 2o6 are suggestive.
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wholesomeness." 13  That rule has gradually established itself in the
common law; and the interpretation of the Sales Act by the courts
bids fair to leave it practically unimpaired.'
4 But it is a sweeping
rule; some courts have felt it harsh; to the standardized represen-
tation and reliance arise then standardized exceptions: "but not 
in
the case of food sold in the original package, where both parties 
rely
on the manufacturer."
15 It must be clear on thought that so far as
either the rule or the exception fails to mirror the true state of mind
of buyer or seller, we have here the law simply affixing an insurer's
duty to a given situation, by reason of history and "policy." And
'It has been argued that the "American theory" is not reliance, but protec-
tion of the consumer's health. 5 IowA L. BULL. 6, 86. This policy has undoubt-
edly been strong in the courts' minds; but it is believed the cases show 
it
always joined, expressly or impliedly, with ideas of ripresentation. 
The desire
to protect health is what has produced the standardization.-What when 
the sale
is to a dealer, for re-sale for ultimate consumption? The Argument 
against
"implied warranty" here is that there is no reasonable ground for standardized
"reliance" by one dealer on another. Cf. Swank v. Battaglia (1917) 
84 Ore.
159, 164 Pac. 7o5, L. R. A. 1917 F 469. If reasonable 
reliance in fact existed,
this would make a difference, under the Sales Act, sec. i5 W ); so probably 
in
the case of package goods. And even at common law the case 
would be
otherwise if the seller were a maker. The measure of damage would 
cover
loss of custom due to serving food as good, in reliance on the seller's 
repre-
sentation. This is the measure which has been held applicable in a suit 
in tort
by a sub-vendee against the maker. Mazetti v. Armour & Co. (913) 
75 Wash.
622, 135 Pac. 633, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 213. But between dealers wholesomeness
may enter merely as an element of merchantability. See Piper Co. v. 
Oppen-
heimer (1913, Tex. Civ. App.) i58 S. W. 777; Neiman v. Channellene 
Oil &
Mfg. Co. (1910) 112 Minn. 1i, i27 N. W. 394; and (1920) 5 IowA L. ButL. 6, 
20.
" Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (igi8) 231 Mass. 9o, i2o 
N. E.
225. The court found in the mere purchase of food 
from a retail dealer a
sufficient indication of the purpose the food was intended for-eating-and
of reliance on the seller in the selection of the food, to raise a warranty 
under
sec. i5 i) ; applying this even to canned food, unless the customer "demands
a particular brand," Jackson v. Watson & Sons [i9og] 2 K. B. 193; Rinaldi
v. Mohican Co. (igi8) 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 47-1. The New York court made
the facts above indicated conclusive of warranty, if nothing more was 
shown-
where the seller had had an opportunity to examine. This leaves it 
open to
require something further, in the case of original package goods. New 
York
also soundly rejects the indications in the Massachusetts cases that the existence
of the warranty must turn on who does "the" selecting: selection 
by the
purchaser for any other purpose than to secure wholesomeness 
should be
wholly without effect on the warranty of wholesomeness.
'Bigelow v. Maine Central Ry. (I912) 1io Maine, io5, 85 Atl. 396, 43 
L. P. A.
(N. S.) 627; see Walters v. United Grocery Co. (1918, Utah) 172 Pac. 
473;
see Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co. (i916) 93 Wash. 48, i6o Pac. 14; Cf.
Mazetti vt. Arnour & Co., supra, n. 12. But this view, while it seems 
to be
finding favor, is not universal. Sloan vi. Woolworth Co. (19T5) 193 Ill App.
62o; Friend v. Childs Dining Hall (igi8) 231 Mass. 65, 12o N. E. 4o7 (Sales
Act) ; cf. Rinaldi v. Mohican Co. (i918) 225 N. Y. 7o, 121 N. E. 471 (Sales 
Act) ;
Cf. Walden v,. Wheeler (1913) 153 Ky. 181, 154 S. W. io8, 44 
L. R. A. (N. S.)
597 (cattle feed; rescission allowed, but not incidental damage).
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if the "warranty" be held as in the Davis case to cover users gen-
erally, we have an insurer's duty on a manufacturer which in its
nature jibes point for point with his duty in tort; it differs only in
that it is more severe, and, apparently, requires the additional fact of
a sale by him, to come into existence.
It admits of a serious doubt whether sellers, in the main, would
willingly assume such flat insurance of quality if their attention were
called to the question; or whether buyers would expect them to; it
admits of doubt equally serious whether, if they would not, the law
should, by main strength, force an insurer's duty-as opposed to a duty
to use all due care-into these cases.16 But what with the common-
law rules protecting consumers of food, and the Sales Act on food
and other articles, there is, as indicated above, strong modem trend
to extend this form of insurer's duty much further than in the past.
This is not without analogy in other fields-as instance the Workmen's
Compensation Acts-and there should be no hesitation in imposing
such duties whenever they have been fairly shown to be socially
desirable. But in the matter of implied warranty, such a showing is
still lacking. Neither the true nature of the doctrine, its basis in
policy, nor its social results have yet been satisfactorily examined.'I
" See (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io68, 107i, and cases cited; cf. Merrill
v. Hodson (1914) 88 Conn. 314, 91 Atl. 533, (1914) 24 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 73;
Travis v. L. & N. R. R. (1913) 183 Ala. 415, 62 So. 851; Valeri v. Pullman Co.
(1914, S. D. N. Y.) 218 Fed. 519. But it should not be forgotten that res ipsa
loquitur can be used to make a negligence rule approach very close to a rule
of guaranty.
'The law has been reviewed extensively. (I918) 27 YALE LAw JoURNAL,
lO68; (igr8) x6 MiCr. L. Rxv. 555; (1919) 7 CALIF. L. REV. 360; (1918) 32
H.xv. L. REV. 71; (1919) 3 MINN. L. REv. 285; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884; 19
ibid. 923; 48 ibid. 213, 219; ibid. 1917 F, 472. By all odds the ablest and
most exhaustive treatment is by Rollin M. Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a
Source of Liability (igig-2o) 5 IowA L. BuLL. 6-35, 86-I11. There the English
theory of reliance by the purchaser is contrasted with the American theory of
protection of the consumer of food, as a basis for imposition of the warranty.
The author's analysis of the subject matter is in the main admirable, and his
views as to the logical consequences of the American theory-with which he
is in full agreement-are so strongly argued as to be almost inescapable-
unless, perhaps, his belief that the Sales Act will work no substantial chinge.
See note 13, supra. Nevertheless, the vital basis of this growing doctrine has
yet to be examined. Research into economic and sociological facts is not a pur-
suit for which judges have great leisure. Cases must be decided as they arise,
and criticism should be made with that in view. But careful research into facts,
not merely into decisions, is needed before any man can intelligently judge
whether an "implied warranty" of wholesomeness is socially desirable at all,
and how far it can wisely be extended. Studies by the Health Departments of
our cities might provide a foundation. It is suggested, with some diffidence,
that such a study ought to include: the number of cases of injury from impure
food, and some-estimate of the damage; a classification of the damage accord-
ing to the nature of the defect causing it, to determine how far due care can
control such damage, and how far, therefore, a warranty rule might work a
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If we assume, however, the wisdom of imposing this insurer's duty
on the dealer in food, then there is much to be said in favor of the
decision in Davis v. VanCamp Packing Co. There is sharp division
on whether a dealer who is not a maker "impliedly warrants" food
sold by him in the original package. Assume first, that he is held
not to. Then we have this rather anomalous situation: if you buy
bulk food, A, the dealer, insures you; B, the maker or grower,
answering only for due care. If you buy package food from the same
dealer A, you gain nothing against B, while you lose your claim on
A as a dealer. If food ought to be insured to the consumer, something
is wrong. The Davis case would find -the remedy in making the
manufacturer insure. Now assume that the dealer is held to "war-
rant" package food. What reason now for the Davis decision? If
there be any truth in the suggestion that "implied warranty" arises
from tacit representation, reasonably relied on, the case is still sound.
Surely a man who packs food for sale makes a tacit representation
to any consumer as sweeping as is the representation of a retailer who
sells food.18 And surely any legitiriate user is, if anything, even more
fully justified in his reliance in the case of goods in can or package.
The proof of package pudding is only in the eating. We cannot
inspect before purchase; to open is to destroy. And even before
eating package food, especially where already cooked, it is difficult
to test with certainty. Which one of us can tell, except by taste or
indigestion, whether his potted pig-meat be pork or porcupine?
Such reasoning brings up again another much-mooted question.
The Van Camp Packing Co. did not sell to Davis. Is "implied
warranty" to be attached only to a sale? It is easy to lay down such
a rul. In Canavan v. City of Mechanicville (192o, App. Div.) i8o
change from a rule based on negligence; a further classification of the damage
according to food prepared, and food not prepared, by the seller (including
a restaurant keeper) ; and in the latter class, according to food open to inspec-
tion and food sold in original packages; an estimate, based on the above, of the
financial ability of the parties liable under the various competing rules, to pay
the damage that would, under each rule, be imposed on them; a study of the
profits of the food business to the dealers and makers (according to the classes
into which they fall under the competing rules), so as to see what proportion
of additional operating expense the rules, if really carried out, would entail;
and finally, a study of the feasibility of distribution of risk, by re-insurance or
otherwise, among the various classes of dealers and makers. If small inde-
pendent dealers, whom a single heavy recovery would ruin, are desirable, the
"warranty" can hardly produce general beneficial effects without such re-in-
surance. The same sort of question comes up in every field of law. For
excellent discussion of the general question, see Felix Frankfurter, Hours of
Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law (i916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 353.
28 See Tomlinson v. Armour & Co. (i9o8, Ct. Err.) 75 N. J. L. 748, 7o Atl.
314, for a clear development of this view.
"It is laid down, practically, in the cases cited in note i5. Cf. also Walters
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N. Y. Supp. 62, the plaintiff was a householder in the defendant city;
he contracted typhoid from germs contained in the water furnished
him. When he sued the city on an "implied warranty" of whole-
someness, a demurrer to his complaint was sustained.20 "Unless there
be a sale with the ordinary circumstances of transfer of title and
possession of the thing sold, for a price given for a particular thing,
the peculiar facts out of which a warranty is implied do not exist,
-and there is no warranty." The court would seem sound in its analysis.
What the plaintiff paid for is indeed a "privilege to make use of
the water as it passed through his dwelling . . . precisely as a
riparian owner might enjoy the right [privilege] to take water from
an open stream."21 And where the cost of water supply is met by
assessments on the realty benefited, the analogy is close, to a cobp-
erative project. But to conclude from this that there can be no war-
ranty is coffee-mill jurisprudence. If the project be codperative,
would not the law do well to apportion the loss incident to its defective
execution? The transaction is not a sale-granted. But that (foes
not touch the vital questions: why do we attach an insurer's duty to
sales of food and drink? and do the same reasons exist, equally
strong, for attaching such a duty to the sale of a privilege of con-
sumption ?22 Practically the same problem is to be found in the recent
cases threshing over the question of "implied warranty" by a restau-
rani keeper. He sells, at least at a table d'h6te meal, not food, but
a privilege of consuming food. That is sound; but it only prepares
the way for an answer to the question of his insurer's duty, or of his
infraction of criminal statutes against the "sale" of game out of
season, or of liquor. Careful analysis is good to see; without it the
law cannot escape confusion. But analysis of itself can solve no
problems. It brings clarity of statement; it does not bring wisdor
of decision.
K. N. L.
-v. United Grocery Co. (igi8, Utah) 172 Pac. 473. Contra, Friend v. Childs
Dining Hall Co. (igig) 231 Mass. 65, 12o N. E. 4o7. See (1918) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, io68, io69; and that the New York rule agrees with Massachusetts
(1920) 5 IOWA L. BULL. 96 ff.
"In accord see Green v. Ashland Water Co. (1898) 1ol Wis. 258, 77 N. W.
722, 43 L. R. A. 117. The court there reasoned largely from the unbearable
burden which the warranty would impose upon the supplier of water. But how
unbearable the burden would be, depends on facts not considered -in the opinion.
See note 17, supra.
"It should, however, be observed that he also obtained a power, to make
such water his own by appropriating it, and so to acquire title and possession
of a thing-as does a riparian owner.
" Indeed, may not the reasons exist, even where no consideration at all is
given the insurer? He is already under such a duty to use all due care. See
Swayze, The Zrowing Law (1915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1, 4-7.
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COMMERCE, LABOR, AND LIQUOR, et al.
Who cansue on a third-party beneficiary contract is not an altogether
settled point.' But onle rarely sees, as in Smart Set Specialty Clothing
Co. v. Franklin Knitting Co.' (192o, App. Div.) 18o N. Y. Supp. 821,
the spectacle of the same man attempting to sue twice. One M had
made a contract with the defendant for the benefit of the company
which is the present plaintiff. M then bought practically all the stock
of" that company,2 and when the contract was broken, sued the
defendant and recovered damages for the diminution in value of his
stock. Now "the plaintiff company"--which is simply M operating
a certain business as a corporation 3-sues the defendant a second
time on the contract. To sustain the complaint, said the court, "would
necessarily result in a double recovery of damages." The decision is
clearly sound. The recovery would indeed be double, not merely
fron the defendant, but for M. But the case does not of itself show
that both promisee and beneficiary, if not identical, may not each
have his right to whatever damages he can prove.
Fol'om Engraving Co. v. McNeil (192o, Mass.) 126 N. E. 479,
illustrates again what seems to be the decided drift of recent judicial
decision to cut down the freedom of action slowly won in past decades
by the labor unions.4 The union there proposed to the plaintiff an
agreement providing absolute collective bargaining, preferential
employment with a minimum wage scale, retention in employment of
permanent employees even if there was not sufficient work for them,
and compulsory arbitration of all disputes. The plaintiffs refused
assent, and the union voted to strike. An injunction was granted
against their striking. The court took its stand on the employer's
"right to.the free flow of labor" unhampered by an unlawful strike:
a strike to enforce a completed contract was one thing, a strike t(o
force an employer into an agreement was another; a strike to secure
See Anson, Contract (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, 1919) 335 ff.
'He held 44 shares, his wife 5, and another person-apparently a dummy
director-held one.
'See (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 659.
'The course of authority up to that date is well outlined by Jeremiah Smith,
Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation (1907) 20 HARV. L. REv. 253, 345, 429. As
illustrating the recent tendency toward limitation, see e. g. Hitchman Coal 6"
Coke Co. v. M1fitchell (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, (igi8) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 779; Webb v. Cooks' etc. Union No. 748 (igi8, Tex. Civ. App.)
205 S. W. 465; Local Union No. 313 v. Stathakis (1918) 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W.
45o, (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 200; Kroger Grocery Co. v. Retail Clerks'
etc. Assn. (igi8, E. D. Mo.) 250 Fed. 89o; Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Ry.
(1919, C. C. A. 9th) 258 Fed. 382; Pattcrson Glass Co. v. Thomas (1919, Calif.
App.) 183 Pac. i9o; Rosenberg v. Retail Clerks' Assn. (igi8, Calif. App.) T!7
Pac. 865.
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monopoly of the work on a particular job for members of a union
already doing a part of that work, was still lawful, 5 but not a strike
aimed at securing a monopoly of the labor market; and finally,
St. 1913, ch. 690, privileging certain kinds of peaceful persuasion,
was limited in its application to lawful strikes.8 How far the decision
is wise, is a question too wide for discussion here. So much is sure:
Picket v. Walsh7 is undergoing that nibbling process by which courts
deny legal effectiveness to a decision out of line with their present
views.
In striking contrast, as extending still farther the unions' freedom
of action, stands New York," her most recent pronouncement being
the hotly contested decision in P. Reardon, Inc. v. Caton (i919, App.
Div.) 178 N. Y. Supp. 7M3. The defendants-associated unincor-
porated unions and officers of unions-had succeeded in unionizing
the entire freight trucking, checking and handling business of the
New York docks, except for the plaintiff and one firm of truckers,
who ran on an open shop basis with working conditions less favorable
than those demanded by the truckmen's union.9 "To bring about a
uniform rate of wages and hours of work, by means of unionizing
the entire laboring force, the various local unions . . . resolved
that members of the unions should not continue to work with non-
union men, and accordingly would refuse to handle merchandise
brought to the piers, or called for at the piers, by . . . truckmen
who were not members of the union." They did so refuse, to the
decided damage of the plaintiff's business; the plaintiff commenced
an action and obtained an injunction pendente lite, but this last the
Appellate Division dissolved, by a vote of three to two. New York
had already ruled that a union was privileged to refuse its members
permission to work in the same shop with non-union men, or to work
'Picket v. Walsh (i9c6) 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.)
io67, 7 Ann. Cas. 638, The court cites the Massachusetts cases to its points,
copiously.
'On the Massachusetts test of the lawfulness of a strike, see also (igig)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 6ii, and (1918) 27 ibid., io88.
'Note 5, supra.
'Bossert v. Dhuy (917) 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582, (i918) 27 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 539. Illustrations of this tendency persisting in other jurisdictions
are Duplex Printing Co. z. Deering (i918, C. C. A. 2d) 252 Fed. 722, over the
sturdy dissent of Rogers, C. J.; State v. Employers Qf Labor (i918, Neb.)
i69 N. W. 717; Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380 (i918, Ariz.) 17, Pac. i2i;
Same v. Corrigan, i76 ibid., 570. The first three cases are valuable. Since the
text w~s written has appeared Michaels v. Hillman (1920, Sup. Ct.) 181 N. Y.
Supp. i65, citing and relying on the Hitchman Case and the New York cases
indiscriminately, without apparently noticing the inconsistencies not only of
their tendencies but of their decisions.
'The plaintiffs demanded a ten-hour day, and did not pay the union rate for
over-time.
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on th erection of materials furnished by a non-union shop, and even
to induce workmen in other trades not to work on such materials; and
that if such determination was reached not primarily with intent to
injure the plaintiff, but primarily to better the condition of the union's
members, incidental injury to the proprietor of the non-union shop
gave him no right to an injunction.'0 The betterment there sought
was the establishment of a nation-wide carpenter's union; that here
sought is the unionization of all the freight-handling of the Port of
New York. The novelty of the instant case lies less in privileging
the boycott even though the immediate benefits must result to a union
not the defendants' own, than in applying the rule to the employees of
common carriers. It is on this that the dissenting judges join issue,
conte'nding that neither a carrier nor its employees is free to refuse
accommodation to any person." The majority answers, that irregu-
larly employed freight-handlers are not on one footing with the regular
agents of a carrier; and moreover that no question regarding carriers
is really presented by the issues. This last seems something of a
refined technicality, in view of the- sister, though separate, case of
Reardon v. International Mercantile Marine Co. (1919, App. Div.)
178 N. Y. Supp. 722, where the same plaintiff was seeking to enjoin
the carriers from allowing their employees to practice the discrimina-
tion in question. That case presents a remarkable instance of the
balance of convenience doctrine.' 2  The injunction was refused
primarily because practically the entire force of 125,ooo dock laborers,
checkers, weighers, etc., were unionized, "and if they are left free
to . . . better their condition by lawful methods, any attempt by
the steamship companies to force them to work with non-union drivers
would* only result in a general strike and tie-up of the freight of the
port." Truly circumstances seem to alter cases. It is interesting that
the majority was obtained in this second case only because Putnam, J.,
though in agreement with the reasoning of the minority, felt himself
bound by the decision in the first case, and felt enjoining the employers,
while leaving the men free to discriminate, to be unjustifiable.
Uniform legislation is somewhat slow in unifying law. In First
Nat. Bank v. Walling (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 218 S. W. io8o, the
problem of Young v. Grote comes up again: a check is drawn so
negligently that raising was made easy; payment of the raised check
is made by the innocent drawee; has it thereby extinguished pro tanto
its debt to its depositor? Yes, says the court-and soundly so."3 But,
1 0Bossert v. Dhuy, supra. But see (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 120.
"One may question whether our neighbor The Freeman would object to this
instance of the use of "that pleasant little device known as the majority of one."
"This doctrine is also hinted at as a ground of decision in P. Reardon, Inc.
-v. Caton.
"(1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 242; and see cases collected Brannan,
Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. 1920) 342, 343.
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though the state's recent adoption of the N. I. L. might surely be
treated as a legislative declaration of policy to unify the law of bills
and notes, no case from any of the conflicting jurisdictions is noted
in the opinion.
In grateful contrast stands Hurlburt v. Bradley (192o, Conn.) io9
Atl. 171. The question there was whether an endorser discharged by
failure to give him notice had power to incur a duty to pay by merely
making a new promise ten years later. The court elucidates cogently,
and approves in principle, the old minority Connecticut rule that with-
out new consideration such a promise was ineffective. "But, however
that may be, our decision is controlled by [N. I. L.] section [lo9] . . .
In the language of the .Kentucky court, when confronted with the
same situation, we feel that the foregoing provision was intended
'to put in force in this state the rule that had theretofore been adopted
in the majority of states.'" The statute puts the new duty on the
ground of waiver. On this point the court's analysis is interesting.
"The question is whether the new promise was made with intent to
relinquish a known right, or in this case a known immunity arising
from the laches of the holder. . . . It is sufficient that, knowing he
was immune from liability . . . he nevertheless promised to
pay.' '±3a Slow it may be; still, the process of unification does go on.
Gilbert v. Rosen (I92O, App. Div.) 18o N. Y. Supp. 772, though
a divided court there read the contract in favor of the plaintiff, sug-
gests a possible escape for gentlemen caught short in such affairs as
the recent Stutz Motors commotion. Suppose the buyer knows at the
time of sale that not enough shares can be had from others than him-
self to fill the contract-does the transaction then offend against the
statutes against speculative sales of futures? Or suppose, as in the
instant case, the "buyer" himself before the delivery date buys up
the only available shares-has he thereby excused the seller by himself
rendering performance impossible ?'1
And still we struggle, by resolution and by argument, to discover
whether the war is over and how far. United States v. McDonald
(March 2, 1920, E. D. N. Y.) 63 N. Y. L. J. 75 (Apr. 7, 1920) sheds
light on one aspect of the question. An alien enemy arrested in January
last on the charge of being a spy, sued out a writ of habeas corpus.
But although "the offense of being a spy is not known to civil or
'a The soundest explanation of the transaction is identical point for point with
that of the effect of a new promise to pay a debt barred by limitation. See
(I919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817.
"'Cf. Patterson v. Meyerhofer (1912) 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472, where the
defendant "buyer" who bought up the land agreed to be conveyed was held
for damages.
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statutory law, and is one of a purely military character, cognizable
only in time of war," his petition was dismissed. Ex parte Milligan
was distinguished, soundly enough, on the ground that the civil courts
are not now (nor ever will be) open to try the prisoner for the offense
for which he was arrested.
The daily papers bring the report that M. Caillaux of dubious fame,
immediately on being convicted and sentenced for a quasi-treasonable
offense, was set free.15 The reason was that he had already spent in
prison, awaiting trial, a term equal to his sentence. There is food for
thought in that report, for bar, for bench and for legislature. It is
no uncommon occurrence for a judge in this country to reduce the
sentence he imposes by the time the prisoner has already been con-
fined. But if that policy is sound-and it would seem to be-there
is a corollary: compensation for the detention of an accused who is
acquitted. 16 Surely if imprisonment before trial is punishment for
the guilty man, it is punishment for the innocent, no less-and punish-
ment which he has not earned.
There is further food, and also drink, for thought in State v. Burcham
(1920, Wash.) 187 Pac. 352. The question there was whether certain
bottles contained intoxicating liquor "other than beer." The jury in
its deliberations dealt with the real evidence in the case (there were
twenty-four pint bottles) by "ought-tastic inference"-to vary Pro-
fessor Wigmore's scientific term'7 to fit the circumstance. The trial
court denied a motion for a new trial on this ground, and the upper
court *"could not say he erred therein." The jury may, metaphysically,
have abused their discretion in tasting to determine "whether it was
whiskey"--no easy thing to determine, in these days, at times-when
the only question was whether it *as intoxicating liquor "other than
beer." But moving for a new trial on the ground that the jury had
by their too much tasting come under the influence of strong drink
seems a rather damaging admission for counsel for the accused to
make. However that may be, may one not suspect that applications
for excuse from jury duty may be less frequent for a time, in
Washington?
Ellis v. Commonwealth (192o, Ky.) 217 S. W. 368, teaches that
whiskey, though it could lawfully be neither possessed nor sold, is still
a subject of larceny. The "law's delay" once more; it took the court
two pages to determine that whiskey is a thing of value. In these
days! A Kentucky court, too.
'New York Times, Sunday, Apr. 25, 1920, p. I.
6For European provisions on the point see Borchard, State Indemnity for
Errors of Criminal Justice, Senate Doe. No. 974, 63d Congr. 3d Sess. See also
Taft, The Delays of the Lawo (igog) 18 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 28.
"' "Autoptic proference." See e. g. 2 Wigmore, Evidence (19o4) secs. 1150-1152.
